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Using patient-identifiable data for observational
research and audit
Overprotection could damage the public interest
Across the world rapid changes in the law,technology, and society are reshaping the wayidentifiable information about patients is
handled. In Britain, doctors’ longstanding common law
duty of confidentiality to their patients has been
supplemented by restrictions on processing electronic
and paper based records in the Data Protection Act
1998, which came into force on 1 March 2000. This
month the United Kingdom’s Medical Research Coun-
cil (MRC) is the latest of several professional organisa-
tions to respond to these developments by updating its
guidance on confidentiality and the use of personal
information (see table on BMJ ’s website).1–4 The MRC
has provided invaluable, balanced guidance but there is
still a real risk that strict and selective application of the
other directives could jeopardise audit, clinical govern-
ance, and observational epidemiological research. This
would compromise patient care and the public interest.
Britain has long had the opportunity for high qual-
ity observational epidemiology and health services
research, using unselected samples of routinely
collected data from hospital and general practitioner
databases. Important advances in our understanding of
aetiology, risk factors, and prognosis have been made
through the use of population surveillance, disease
registries, longitudinal cohorts, and case-control
studies. These have inevitably involved using data
about large numbers of people, sometimes without
their consent. To our knowledge, there are no cases
where researchers or auditors conducting such studies
have been accused of breaching confidentiality.
Ideally, patients in a research study or audit should
have given their consent to the use of data that prefer-
ably should not identify them directly. This consent can
be implicit when a patient is aware of the disclosure
and their right to refuse, yet makes no objection.3
Although explicit written consent is essential for most
trials of any intervention, it is an unrealistic
requirement of observational research and audit,
particularly if these rely on huge quantities of
previously collected data. Systematic bias could
invalidate the findings of observational studies if
people were excluded because they did not consent.
For example, obtaining consent could be biased by age
or gender, and by whether individuals are dead,
untraceable, cognitively impaired, or deemed too
distressed to be approached for their consent.
Anonymised information is often not sufficient
because patient-identifiable data are required to avoid
duplication and to follow up individuals indirectly. In a
recent legal ruling, the disclosure of anonymised data,
without consent from every individual, was thought to
constitute a breach of the duty of confidence owed to
patients. This might have had detrimental implications
for observational research and audit,5 had it not been
overturned by the Court of Appeal,6 although a further
appeal to the House of Lords may be made.
A blanket requirement for anonymisation of data,
as well as informed consent from all individuals to use
identifiable data about them, would jeopardise the
methodological integrity of research and audit. This
would not just hinder the progress of medical
knowledge but might lead to completely incorrect
conclusions. This would be against the public interest
and make the process of clinical governance impos-
sible. Therefore we believe the following changes are
necessary.
Firstly, the law needs to be clarified. The Data Pro-
tection Act 1998 has established a schedule of eight
principles, accompanied by supplementary schedules
of conditions. The third schedule states that any use of
identifiable data relating to the “physical or mental
health or condition” of a living individual requires
either his or her informed consent, or that the
“processing is necessary for medical purposes” (sched-
ule 3, paragraph 8). While these “medical purposes”
include “medical research,” audit is not specifically
mentioned, there is no definition of medical research,
and no exceptions to the need for consent are given
(section 33). Despite this, a recent British statutory
instrument sanctions the processing of patient-
identifiable data so long as it is in the public interest, is
necessary for research, does not influence decisions
made about individuals, and does not damage them
(paragraph 9).7 However, it does not mention informed
consent. These statutes need clarification, as do the
additional implications of common law and recent case
law6 on the duty of confidentiality, and to what extent it
accommodates public interest.8
Secondly, some consistent guidance offered by
professional organisations would help. Informed
consent is required for the use of identifiable
information from every individual in any medical
research study by the British Medical Association.3 This
is not required by other organisations.2 4 9–11 The
requirements of audit and observational research for
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informed consent sometimes differ,2 3 causing yet
another unacceptable double standard in distinguish-
ing the two.12
Thirdly, public consultation is needed to determine
the ideal balance between, on the one hand, individual
confidentiality and data protection and, on the other,
the legitimate use of patient-identifiable data without
consent. Patients may not regard their contact with the
National Health Service as constituting implied
consent to the use of identifiable data about themselves
for purposes other than their own medical care.
However, there is a public interest in conducting
observational research into diseases where little
information is available and into audit of medical serv-
ices which might be inadequate.2 Hindering this proc-
ess may be unethical.13
Ambiguous statutory regulations, contradictory
guidance, and a vocal minority of objecting patients or
those representing them will thwart observational
research relying on patient-identifiable data, audit, and
clinical governance. Investigators must design studies
appropriately and need to know that their use of exist-
ing, valuable datasets is legitimate. Ethics committees
must review proposals consistently and should not be
threatened with court action to determine where the
public interest lies. Patients should be made aware of
which data about them may be used for purposes
which further the public interest and the understand-
ing and management of their own disorder. 10
We are in a period of transition. In addition to the
Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates most of
the European convention on human rights, there may
be further implications if Britain signs and ratifies the
European Convention on Human Rights and Bio-
medicine14 and a protocol in preparation which may
cover observational research. This is an important time
to protect the legitimate use of patient-identifiable data
for unbiased observational medical research and audit.
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The current status of psychological debriefing
It may do more harm than good
Despite the widespread use of psychologicaldebriefing, serious concerns have been raisedabout its effectiveness and potential to do
harm.1 2 Psychological debriefing is broadly defined as
a set of procedures including counselling and the giv-
ing of information aimed at preventing psychological
morbidity and aiding recovery after a traumatic event.
In 1995 Raphael and colleagues emphasised that there
was an urgent need for reliable evidence from
randomised controlled trials on the impact and worth
of debriefing.3 Unfortunately, the news has not been
good for debriefing.
Debriefing is generally applied within the first few
days after a traumatic event, lasts one to three hours,
and usually includes procedures that encourage and
normalise emotional expression. Debriefing can also
be more narrowly defined in terms of the procedures
used, the information provided and the target popula-
tion. One example of this type of debriefing is known
as critical incident stress debriefing.4
A recent Cochrane review of eight randomised
trials found no evidence that debriefing had any
impact on psychological morbidity.5 The authors
recommended that compulsory debriefing should
cease. This was in part based on evidence that poorer
outcomes were sometimes associated with debriefing.
In this week’s BMJ, the large randomised trial of
debriefing after childbirth by Small et al (p 1043) pro-
vides yet more evidence that debriefing is ineffective.6
This study also provides further evidence that negative
outcomes may be associated with debriefing.
Evidence about the ineffectiveness of debriefing
has come from randomised trials that have used broad
definitions of debriefing; thus, it might be that these
findings have arisen because an inappropriate form of
debriefing was used. It has been argued that if a more
prescribed form, such as critical incident stress debrief-
ing or its descendant, critical incident stress manage-
ment, were used the outcomes would be different.
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